

PROCEEDINGS

OF THE

Dublin
FREEHOLDER'S-SOCIETY,

Now Collected and Re-published, at their Desire.

TOGETHER WITH

Some further **Q U E R I E S** from that
SOCIETY, never publish'd before.

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PROCEEDINGS

OF THE

ENTHUSIASTIC SOCIETY

Now created and published, under the



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DECLARATION

OF THE

FREEHOLDER'S-SOCIETY

Of 27th *May* 1756.

DECLARED, that it is the Intention of this Society, to be active in the following Particulars.

I. In promoting, to the utmost of our Power, every Measure that may be necessary or useful for the strengthening of his Majesty's Arms, against his injurious and most perfidious Enemies.

II. In supporting the Prerogatives of the Crown and Rights of the People ; by a vigorous and steady Opposition to all factious Attempts against the former, and ministerial Attacks upon the latter.

III. In supporting and promoting the Protestant Interest.

IV. In asserting public Property in the public Money ; and in stopping and preventing, by all constitutional Means, the Application thereof to any other than public Uses.

V. In procuring, upon all proper Occasions, just Representations from Parliament, of real national Grievances : Being incited hereunto, not only by personal Interest and Love of our Country, but also by the strongest and warmest Sentiments of Loyalty and Affection for our most excellent Monarch ; fully sen-

fible that stronger or more substantial Proof of Attachment in a People to their Sovereign cannot be given, than by informing him of the Misconduct of his Ministers.

VI. In discouraging and opposing all Means of enlarging ministerial Influence, in the House of Commons : being clearly of Opinion that Representatives in Parliament, free from such Influence and united with their Constituents and with each other in the strongest Principles of Loyalty, cannot but act for the public Good, the common Interest of themselves, their Constituents and their Sovereign ; and that whensoever Measures are taken for enlarging ministerial Influence over such Representatives, such Measures cannot be taken for any other than private Ends.

VII. In exerting our utmost Endeavours to procure a Repeal of such Laws as, from Change of Times, may, by Experience, be found detrimental to the common Good ; useful only to enlarge the Power of a Few ; though originally well adapted to the then Circumstances of the Kingdom : Still paying full Obedience and Submission to all the Laws, whilst in force ; how hurtful soever some of them may perhaps be to the Public, in our private Opinion.

VIII. In renewing and redoubling our Endeavours for the Passing of such Laws, heretofore rejected in this Kingdom, as shall be found agreeable to the general Sense of the Nation : Being confident that the general Sense of such a Nation as this, growing in their knowledge of and Attention to the true Interest of their Country and united with the generality of their Fellow-Subjects both in Interest and Affection, must, in the end, prevail against the limited Interests of particular Persons, and the ambitious Views of any aspiring Individuals.

IX. In promoting Freedom of Elections and Independency of Parliament : Preferring such Candidates as are free from Ministerial Influence, and most
like-

likely to continue so : Not suffering any Candidate, set up or supported by us in opposition to such Influence, to be at any Expence in entertaining us or any of our Tenants : And opposing all uncommon accumulation of Power, in any one Person or Family ; and every other Measure, tending to establish a leading Influence in the House of Commons : Such an Influence being, in its Nature, unconstitutional ; in its consequences, oppressive ; and in its tendency, Subversive of the fundamental Ends and Uses of Parliament.

X. In instituting and supporting Societies, in our respective Countries, for promoting Public Spirit ; and in recommending Examples of that kind in the Metropolis, suitable to its Dignity and Importance : The Spirit of the Constituents being the only sure Support of our inestimable Constitution, against the Schemes of ambitious Men.

May 27th, 1756.

QUERIES, *proposed by the FREEHOLDER'S Society, to the People of IRELAND.*

NUMBER I.

ARE not the true Interests of the King and his People, inseparably connected ?

May not bad Ministers, in their ministerial Conduct, have private Interests to pursue, inconsistent with the common Good ?

Is it not their Interest to recommend to Offices, Men subservient to their private Purposes ; in Preference to Men more meritorious ?

Are not Offices of public Trust, both Civil and Military, often procured by bad Ministers, from private Motives, for Persons unfit for the same ?

Is it the King's Interest to put the Properties and Lives of his Subjects and Defence of his Dominions, into the Hands of improper Persons ?

Is it not the Interest of bad Ministers to procure Pensions out of the public Money, for such as are able (and willing on such Terms) to assist them in carrying on their evil Measures, and screen such Measures from public Censure?

Is it not their Interest to enrich themselves, their Families, their Friends and Dependants, at the public Expence?

Must not private Interest and public Good generally draw different Ways in the Breast of every Minister, throughout the whole Course of his Administration; and will not the one or the other prevail, according to his Measure of Vice or Virtue?

Are Ministers more virtuous than other Men?

Are they not liable to stronger Temptations?

May it not be reasonably presumed, that private Interest out-weighs public Good in the greatest Part of them; unless the Contrary appears from their Conduct?

Should not Measures recommended by them be, at all Times, received with Caution and examined with Care?

February 3, 1757.

NUMBER II.

Can any Doctrine be more false or dangerous than this; That Opposition to Ministers is Opposition to Government, and a breach of Duty to the King; and that Inquiries into the Conduct of Ministers, are offensive to, and indicate a Want of due Reverence for Majesty?

Is not this insidious Doctrine industriously propagated by bad Ministers and their Abettors?

Can the People be too vigilant or active in their Inspection into the Conduct of Ministers: or can a Parliament give a stronger or more substantial Proof of their Loyalty and Fidelity to their Sovereign, or of their Attachment to his true Interest, than by opposing all bad Measures of his Ministers; inquiring in the strictest Manner, into their Conduct; and
giving

giving him the fullest Information of every Misconduct detected?

Are not such Inquiries and Opposition, the Duty of Parliament; a most important and necessary Part of their Business?

In what Light are the Men to be regarded who abuse the venerable Name of Government, or profane the sacred Name of Majesty; to check such salutary Opposition, or stifle such necessary Inquiries?

Is not every Man who discourages the Means of opposing, detecting or punishing a ministerial Offender, an Accomplice in the Guilt?

If any Member of Parliament should act such a Part; how can he acquit himself to his King or Country, or to his own Conscience?

February 15, 1757.

N U M B E R III.

Have not Emissaries of bad Ministers sometimes gone about, under the Mask of Patriotism, the better to disguise their Poison?

Are not these political Jesuits, a most dangerous Set of Men?

Can they be too much guarded against?

February 15, 1757.

N U M B E R IV.

Is it possible for the most virtuous, active and vigilant Prince that ever sat on any Throne, to see with his own Eyes, throughout such populous and extensive Dominions as these?

Is it possible for him to know, but from Information of his Ministers, the Merits of his Subjects or Exigencies of a Country where he never resided?

Can the Grants of *Irish* Places or Pensions be justly considered as the King's own Acts?

Are not such Grants, for the most Part, in reality the Acts of his Ministers?

Was there ever an Instance in this Kingdom, where any Supply, requisite for the Uses of Government, was refused; or where any such Supply was not readily and chearfully granted?

Can any such Instance be apprehended in a Kingdom, where both Constituents and Representatives are unanimous in the strongest and warmest Sentiments of Loyalty?

Can Pensions to Persons never in any Office of Government, be necessary, in such a Kingdom, for carrying on, the Business of Government?

Are not such Pensions, in such a Kingdom, generally to be considered as machinated by bad Ministers, to serve their private Purposes at the Public Expence?

February 19th, 1757.

N U M B E R V.

Have not the Redundancies of public Money been large, of late Years?

Have we not Reason to expect that such Redundancies, in Times to come, will be considerable; unless some of the additional Duties be suffered to drop?

Can these Redundancies be so usefully laid out, in a Country not half-peopled nor half-employed, scarce reclaimed from Barbarism, just beginning to emerge out of Beggary; can such Redundancies, in such a Country, be so usefully laid out as in supporting and promoting Manufactures, Tillage and In-land Navigation, encouraging Fisheries, making and improving Harbours and peopling Desarts?

Will not such Uses as these, for Ages to come, afford Room sufficient to employ the utmost Redundancies, our most sanguine Wishes can suggest?

Doth

Doth not the Infant-State of most of our Manufactures, where we happen to have any ; do not the Calamities which this Nation often groans under, for want of Tillage ; the depopulated Condition of the greatest and most fertile Part of our Island ; the want of Employment for our Poor, who therefore go out in Swarms to earn their Bread in other Countries ; Multitudes of them, at certain Seasons, wandering over the neighbouring Kingdom, seeking for Employment, and, where that is not to be found, begging or starving ; others of them enlisting in foreign Service, strong in the native Valour of these Islands ; but Parricide-like, signaling that Valour, to destroy the Country which gave it Birth ; adding such unnatural Force to the Arms of our inveterate Enemy, as was known, in the last War, to turn the Scale in the decisive Battle ; doth not the Poverty of our People in general ; and the deplorable, shocking, almost incredible Wretchedness of the low People of our two Southern Provinces ; whose Scraps of Raiment are Rags ; the Huts they live in, not fit for the Habitation of Swine, more resembling Dunghills than Houses ; their meagre Bodies and ghastly Visages, Pictures of Famine and Despair ; do not all these unite their Voices and cry aloud for Aids, out of the Redundancies of our national Treasure : Or will employing these Redundancies in Pensions to mercenary Men, for prostituting themselves to the Ambition or Avarice of a bad Minister, be more conducive to the strengthening of his Majesty's Arms, to the Peace and Security of his Kingdoms, and to the Wealth and Happiness of his People ?

February 26th, 1757. 727

N U M B E R VI.

Do not the true Riches of a Prince, consist in the Wealth, Industry and Numbers of his Subjects ?
Would

Would establishing the Claim of private Property in the hereditary Revenue of *Ireland* (enriching bad Ministers and their Adherents, by impoverishing the rest of the People) tend to increase or diminish the real Wealth and Strength of the Crown?

Is not this Claim of private Property in the hereditary Revenue, the only Thing that can give the least Colour of Legality to private Pensions on the *Irish* Establishment?

Hath it not been fully proved by a Pamphlet published here about a Year ago, said to be written by a Gentleman of the Bar, * that this Claim is ill grounded; that the Whole of the hereditary Revenue (excepting some inconsiderable Branches) is public Money, and not the King's private Property; and, by the Law of Reason and public Policy, the Laws of natural Justice and the Laws of the Land, ought to be applied to the public Uses of this Kingdom; and not to private Pensions or any other private Uses?

Has that Pamphlet been ever answered?

Can it be imagined that a Pamphlet supporting a Doctrine so hurtful to the Purposes of evil Ministers, would have been suffered to remain so long unanswered; if it were answerable?

Is not this Doctrine, now, universally allowed?

Is there a Minister or Ministerial Man in either Kingdom, at this Day, so bare-faced an Enemy to his King and Country, as to stand forth in public and assert, That the hereditary Revenue of *Ireland* may be lawfully applied to private Pensions, or any other private Uses which Ministers shall think fit to recommend.

March 5th, 1757.

N U M B E R VII.

Can it be imagined that Pensions granted to private Persons, out of public Money; not grounded on public

* *Previous Consent discussed.*

public Services, either past or present; utterly unsupported, nay flatly contradicted by public Policy; Pensions not flowing from royal Bounty; but wholly arising from Suggestions of a Minister; calculated merely for Purposes, and used as Instruments of Corruption; Pensions, clearly detrimental to the Interest of the Crown; highly injurious to the Property of the Subject; is it possible to conceive that such Pensions (if such there be) could have been obtained from a wise and most righteous Prince; otherwise than by the blackest Frauds, the foulest Misrepresentations?

Can you consider the Ministers who have obtained, for their Accomplices, such Pensions by such Means; can you justly estimate such Ministers (if such there be or were) otherwise than as Betrayers of their Master, Robbers of their Fellow-Subjects and Plunderers of their Country?

On the Duty of Parliaments to their Sovereign, on the Trust committed to them by their Country, on the established Laws of Equity and Justice, can there be the least Ground of Hesitation in addressing the Crown, for Resumption of such Pensions, if such there be?

Is there a Man, with the least Spark of public Virtue, the smallest Grain of common Justice remaining in his Frame, who would not rejoice in the Resumption of such Pensions; and glory in his Assent to the imprinting Brands of national Infamy, on the exalted, lawless, eminently impious Procurers?

March 12th, 1757.

N U M B E R VIII.

Are not several hundreds of Thousands of *Irish* Rents, annually Spent in *Great Britain*?

Have not many Millions of those Rents been expended there, in the Compass of a very few Years?

Must not this Fund of Wealth to *Great Britain*, always rise or fall, in Proportion to the Decrease or Increase of the Poverty of *Ireland*?

If we ever arrive at Wealth ; will not our Superfluities, and much more, always Center in the Seat of Empire, the Place of Pleasure, the Fountain of Power, Honour and Promotion ?

Would supporting a Claim, which clearly and necessarily tends to enrich bad Ministers and their Abettors by impoverishing *Ireland*, increase or lessen the Wealth of *Great Britain* ?

Can it be imagined that a just and wise People would, against Law, Support a Claim evidently hurtful to themselves ?

Have not the People of *Great Britain* been ever distinguished for their Love of Liberty, and Vigilance in preserving it ?

How could they, otherwise, have continued so long a free People ; after so many other Nations, anciently modelled on the same Plan of Liberty, fell into Bondage ?

Could such a People think their Liberty Secure ; if you were Slaves ?

Is not Slavery catching, as Fire ; in Case of Nations so contiguous, connected and blended ?

Is it possible to conceive that a People, ever Watchful ever Jealous of their Liberties, would Support a Claim naturally tending to bring the Contagion of Slavery to their Doors ?

Would Supporting a Claim which would add four or five hundred thousand Pounds a Year to the Ministerial Funds, to be employed in either Kingdom, by bad Ministers (if such should be our lot) according as their Exigencies of Bribery and Corruption, their Cravings of Avarice and Ambition might require ; would Supporting such a Claim, increase or lessen the Security of *British* Liberty ?

Is there the least Colour to apprehend that any Minister of either Kingdom, after a proper Remonstrance from *Ireland* upon this Head, could be possessed of such infatuated Audacity, as to insist on this Claim of private Property in the *Irish* hereditary Revenue ;

venue ; in manifest and direct Opposition to the common Laws, common Sense, common Interest, and common Safety of both Kingdoms ?

How are you to Judge of the Men who call Disputing this Claim, a quarrelling with *Great Britain* ?

Must not such Men be Dupes, or———what Decency forbids to Name, what Honour abhors to think of ?

March 19th, 1754.

N U M B E R IX.

Have not private Pensions, on the *Irish* Establishment, been gradually increasing for many Years ?

Whether is it more likely that ministerial Exigencies will decrease or increase, for the Time to come ?

Do not these Pensions, already, far exceed the King's private Revenue here ?

Is it not high Time to take some proper Measure, for checking the Growth of these Pensions ?

What can be a more proper Time for that Purpose, than the next Session of Parliament ; the first, since the Law, upon this Head, became universally known ?

May not any Length of Acquiescence, after such Knowledge, be, with great Plausibility, turned against you ; and render Redress more difficult to be obtained ? Can you, in the mean Time, until public Property in the hereditary Revenue be asserted in a parliamentary Way, have any reasonable Security that Sums larger than this Kingdom can bear, will not be drawn out of it, to answer the Purposes of bad Ministers elsewhere ?

Can a Nation, whose current Cash doth not exceed a Million and whose Paper-Credit is much impaired, bear any considerable Increase in the Drains of their Specie, without becoming Bankrupt ?

Is it not possible that some Minister may, in the mean Time, be wicked enough to gratify his Ambition

tion or glut his Avarice ; by Means which must beggar, and may enslave You ?

Doth not the Security of your Liberties and Property depend on your speedy asserting, in a national Way, the national Right in your national Treasure ?

Must not your Liberties and Property, your Laws, your Religion, the Bread ye eat, every Blessing, every Necessary ye enjoy, your very Existence as a Nation ; must not all these, for ever, remain insecure ; every Hour become more and more difficult to be secured ; until such Right be so asserted ?

March 26, 1757.

N U M B E R X.

Hath not Experience of the present and past Times often furnished Instances of Men of large Fortunes, as thoroughly devoted to the Service of ministerial Patrons, as those whose daily Bread depends on such Patronage ?

Suppose a Member of Parliament of an independent Fortune, in Possession of some lucrative Office at Will ; or led on, by Promises of some such Office, or of something else, perhaps more suited to his Taste ; as a Title, a Seat at the Council-Board, a Government of a County, or the like ; or kept in Humour by a Commission in the Army, given to a Son or Brother ; or by some Place in the Revenue, given to a poor Relation or Dependant ; or by being gratified, now and then, in a Sheriff, &c. suppose this Gentleman, a Man of Sense ; but void of public Virtue ; and his Vote insisted on by some bad Minister, in Favour of some Point very injurious to the Interest of his Country : May not such a Man, upon such an Occasion, be naturally supposed to fall into something, like the following Soliloquy ?

“ If the Ministry prevail in this Question ; the
 “ Country will be hurt, and my private Fortune must
 “ suffer in Proportion : But the Profits of the Office,
 “ I am

“ I am in Possession of, or have full Assurances of
 “ obtaining, if I intitle myself to it by my parlia-
 “ mentary Conduct, will repay me tenfold ; or the
 “ Favour I expect from the Government (tho’ not
 “ lucrative, but meerly honourary) will give me
 “ much more Pleasure than my Share of the public
 “ Loss can give me Pain. As to my Character, I
 “ don’t think it will suffer much. We have Orators
 “ in the House, to puzzle the Question and save us
 “ from the Shame of barefaced Iniquity : These will
 “ furnish me with a Stock of Sophistry, which (with
 “ the Help of a little misrepresenting of Facts, if
 “ necessary) will enable me to excuse myself to my
 “ Constituents ; by persuading them that the Question
 “ admitted of different Opinions, and that I voted
 “ according to my Judgment. ’Tis true, the Mi-
 “ nister’s prevailing in such Points as this, must
 “ weaken the Constitution ; and may, at Length,
 “ subvert it : But the Constitution is likely to outlast
 “ my Time ; and I see no Reason why I should not
 “ love myself better than my Posterity. I love my
 “ Country as much as any Man is bound to do ; as
 “ much as any wise Man can do : I always regard
 “ her Interest, where it does not clash with my own ;
 “ and I don’t think any Man but an Enthusiast, can
 “ be led by his Notions of Virtue and public Spirit,
 “ to carry his Patriotism further. Enthusiasm is,
 “ without Doubt, a Species of Madness. By the
 “ Blessing of God, I shall never act the Part of a
 “ mad Man, either in my public or private Capa-
 “ city ; but will ever make my own Interest, the
 “ primary Rule of my Conduct, the governing
 “ Principle of my Life.”

April 2, 1757.

N U M B E R X I.

Can any Person of common Experience or common
Under-

Understanding be, in any Degree, influenced by a Man's talking of his Stake in the Country ?

Are there not Temptations, adapted to all Ranks ?

Can Fortune give Virtue, to resist Temptations ?

Are Temptations usually resisted, without Virtue ?

Are not public and private Virtue, inseparably connected ?

Can the former subsist, without the latter ?

Doth not History, doth not sad Experience shew, it never did ? Doth not common Sense evince, it never can ?

What can be a more flagrant Violation of the Trust vested in the Constituents, than their chusing Representatives confessedly void of private Virtue ; how independent soever, in Point of Fortune ?

Are not such Constituents, such impious Violators of a most important Trust, equally criminal with those avowed, shameless, abandoned Traytors to their King and Country, who choose, for Representatives, for Guardians of the People, for Counsellors of the Prince, for Law-givers of the Realm, Hirelings, that can not live, but by their Wages ; who must abet and screen their Masters, or Starve : Hirelings of Ministers——Ministers, ever tempted by private Interest, to abuse the Confidence of their Prince, purloin his national Treasure and beggar his People ; ever yielding to Temptation, if not armed by Virtue or awed by dread of popular Censure ?

April 9, 1757.

N U M B E R XII.

Would a Man of Virtue betray his Country for a Bribe ?

What are you to think of those who openly assert that all Men are venal, and differ only in their Prices ?

Hath not this pernicious Doctrine been industriously propagated by evil Ministers and their Partizans ?

Is it possible to forge a Doctrine, more thoroughly adapted to their evil Purposes ?

Doth it not clearly and necessarily imply that Virtue is a Chimera, without real Existence ?

Are not the Men who would thus degrade their Species, a Dishonour to human Kind ?

Are not the Men who would thus set Mankind loose from all Ties of Conscience, avowed Enemies to Religion ?

Are not the Men who would thus dissolve the Bands of Society, real Enemies to their King and Country ?

Are not the Men who thus endeavour, as much as in them lies, to throw the Nation into a Chaos of Anarchy and Confusion ; by destroying the moral and religious Obligation of all Laws, human and divine ; highly criminal by the Laws of the Land ?

Is their Crime, in its Consequences, less mischievous than Blasphemy ?

Are not they more noxious than Wolves or Bears ?

Do not they devour the vitals of the human Mind ?

Would you not avoid them as Beasts of Prey ; if it were not your Duty to hunt them down ?

April 16, 1757.

N U M B E R XIII.

Hath not the late Alteration in the British System (extending the Length of Parliaments, from three to seven Years) render'd the strictest Inspection of the People into the Parliamentary Conduct of their Representatives, necessary in that Kingdom ?

If such Inspection hath been found necessary, where a Parliament can not last longer than seven Years ; how urgent must be the Necessity of it, where a Parliament is permitted to continue for twenty or thirty

B

Years ;

Years ; or longer, when the Monarch happens to live longer ?

Have not bad Ministers, in both Kingdoms, been sometimes disappointed in their Measures, by means of such Inspection ?

Have not bad Ministers and their Abettors, in both Kingdoms, dreading the Effects of such Inspection (as deadly to them, tho' salutary to the Nation) vainly attempted to discourage it ; by calling those who have Virtue to promote it, *Incendiaries* ; and the just Complaints and Resentments which often follow it, *Sedition* ?

Would they have rested on such impotent Scurrility ; would they, in this Kingdom, have spared the most odious, the vilest of Names, *Republican*, *Jacobite* ; had there been any Colour for such Calumny on Protestants, here ?

What, but the most active Inspection, can save a People ; whose Deputies, sent to guard their Rights, enjoy a Tenure for life in the Office ; not accountable, in the mean Time, for Misbehaviour ; Tempted, in the mean Time (if the Minister be corrupt) by the very Money of their Constituents to betray them ?

Are the Deputies more virtuous than the Principals ?

Are they not more liable to Temptations ?

Most pernicious Abuses of Parliamentary Trust ; above the reach of laws——Most powerful Temptations to these Abuses ; fitted to all Tastes and Sizes——Is it in the Nature of Man to resist such Temptations, but by Virtue ; or by the Terrors of Infamy, Contempt, Resentment of an injured People ?

April 23, 1757.

N U M B E R X I V .

Is there any Instance in these Kingdoms, where the general Sense of the People, openly and strongly declared

declared and steddily adhered to, did not finally prevail against the shameless Apostacies, often brought about by bad Ministers, in Struggles of that Kind ; whereby the Cause of public Virtue may, for a Time, be dishonoured ; and the People, afflicted ?

What are the most effectual Means of preserving and strengthening the general Sense of the People, and rendering it successful against the Claim of private Property in the public Money, and such like capital Measures of evil Ministers ?

Can any Means be devised, so effectual, for that End, as the continuing and enlarging your public-spirited Meetings ; therein animating each other with such strong, united and undaunted Sentiments of public Virtue, as the Nature of Man, without the powerful Influence of Society, cannot attain to ; and boldly, but decently, expressing those Sentiments, in spirited Resolutions, nervous Declarations to the Public and ardent Exhortations to your Representatives in Parliament : always proportioning the Measure of your Spirit, to the Occasion : still remembering, that the angry Exertion of popular Zeal is a most dangerous and desperate Remedy ; never to be used, unless—Which Heaven avert !—Some Disease, in its nature deadly, be raised by Corruption to such a Degree of Strength, as shall be found sufficient to baffle all the regular Means of Cure ?—We shudder at the Thought !

Without the invigorating, collected, impelling Aid of Societies for promoting public Spirit, is it possible to withstand that growing Torrent of Corruption which hath already overspread, and, if not stem'd, must at Length overwhelm the Land ?

Do not all the Objections which have been, or can be made to such Societies, receive what Colour they have, from Abuses ?

Is there, or was there ever, at any Time, any Institution, human or divine, free from Objections of that Kind ?

Can such Objections support a Shadow of any rational Inference, but this ; that all possible Care should be taken to prevent Abuses, so far as the Follies and Infirmities of human Nature will admit.

N U M B E R X V .

Is there, in the Class of Virtues, one higher than public Spirit ?

Is there a Virtue, more amiable or more honourable in it's Nature ; more conducive to your temporal Interest, or more agreeable to the true Principles and Spirit of Christianity ?

Is there a Virtue, so fitted for the Defence of Liberty ; against her deadly Foes, popular Licentiousness and ministerial Ambition ?

Is there a Virtue, so adapted, at all Times, to promote Loyalty and Reverence for the Monarch (our Bulwark against that Hydra-headed Monster, popular Government) so perfectly adapted, at this Time, to inspire the warmest Affection, Gratitude and filial Piety for the Father of his People ?

Can there be a more vile, more sordid, more brutish Character upon Earth ; than that of a Man, void of public Spirit ?

Is there a Man among you ; excluding Partizans, Dupes, Hirelings and Slaves ; is there a Man among you, who hath any Regard for the Honour of his Prince or Welfare of his Country ; or any Feelings for the Poverty, the Misery, the Wretchedness of more than one Half of his Fellow-Subjects in this Kingdom ; and yet can remain inactive in encouraging and enlarging your Societies, instituted for promoting that loyal, constitutional, amiable, exalted, God-like Virtue, public Spirit ?

May 7th, 1757.

N U M B E R XVI.

Is it not easy for an Administration to form a Parliament, of modern Length, to their Mind; and afterwards find Means to procure a new Parliament of the same Stamp? Does not woful Experience shew, they have usually done so?

Did not annual Parliaments express the Sense of the People? Have long Parliaments usually done so? If they do not; how can the People preserve themselves, on Occasions of imminent Danger, without expressing their own Sense?

How can a bad Administration (supported by a Parliament of their own making) be overturned? How, but by the Voice of the People? How can a bad Administration (overturned by the Voice of the People, struggling to be re-instated by Means of a Parliament of their own making) be kept out? How, but by the Voice of the People?

Have not long Parliaments given Birth to that Monster in the Constitution (unknown to our Ancestors) called a Prime Minister? Has not this Monster sometimes turned Parliaments into Ministerial Cabals; set himself up, by their Aid, above both King and People; diminished the regal Authority; and occasioned a Tendency to the worst of Tyrannies, an Aristocracy?

If it be impracticable to get rid of this dangerous Office, until the ancient System of Parliaments be restored; can any Thing, in the mean Time, be of higher Importance, than the Choice of a Person to fill this Office?

If the People, on such an Occasion, meanly suffer themselves to be awed or duped into Silence; how can they expect Deliverance? When Ministers (who, to the immortal Honour of our Sovereign, have been displaced at the Instance of his injured People) attempt to get in again; can we expect that a Parliament modelled by those very Ministers, will attempt

to keep them out? Will not such a Parliament contrive Means to re-instate them, if the People be silent?

Must not the united Sense of both Kingdoms, have more Weight than the separate Sense of either? Are not many Parts of *Ireland* less remote from *London* (not only in Distance, but in Correspondence, Intercourse and Intelligence) than many Parts of *England*?

Are you less concerned than the People of *England*, in the Choice of a Prime Minister? Is not your All at Stake, as well as theirs? Are not the Affairs of this, as well as that Kingdom, under the Conduct, almost the Breath of the Prime Minister?

Can you hesitate a Moment, in declaring your Sense of a public and most important Matter, wherein you yourselves are directly and immediately interested? Can you have a Moment's Doubt, that your Sense is well founded; when it co-incides with that of your Fellow-Subjects in *England*.

Is it not alike the Duty and Interest of each Kingdom, with united Voice, freely and boldly to declare their Sense, tending to the common Preservation of the Whole?

Had not the Ministry and People of *England* great Reason to despise us; whilst we continued to be gulled into stupid Silence; tho' ever so loudly called on, by the common Interest, to speak? Can they be Friends to either Kingdom, who would persuade us to be inattentive to the Interest of both?

Can a bad Man in private Life, be a good Man in Public? Can the King have full personal Knowledge of the private Characters of his Subjects? Can those who have personal Intercourse with the King, be always depended on, for just Information? Are they not usually biassed by Connections? Is not the general Sense of the People, much more to be depended on? Is it not desirable, that the King should know their Sense; to detect Misinformation, given by Deceivers.

Did

Did *Britons* ever see a more extraordinary Juncture ? Is there not wanted, some extraordinary Person, suited to this extraordinary Juncture.

Superior natural Abilities—The most extensive Knowledge of public Affairs, acquir'd by incessant Application—Strict Temperance—An utter contempt of Wealth—An Abhorrence of Luxury of all Kinds—Moderation in all Sorts of Expence—A detestation of that fashionable, ruinous Vice, Gaming—An Indignation against all Embezzlement and profusion of public Money—An Abomination of every Species of Bribery and Corruption—Firmness and Intrepidity, to give Steadiness and Perseverance in pursuit of public good, under Difficulties and Dangers—The strictest Regularity, Assiduity and Integrity, both in private and public Life—A thorough love of the British Constitution and an ardent desire of its Revival—Are not these, Qualities desirable in a Prime Minister ? If there be a Man so qualified ; is he not the extraordinary Person that this extraordinary Juncture requires, and ought he not to have the Voice of the people ?

Dublin, July 5th, 1757.

QUERIES *addressed to the* FREEHOLDER'S SOCIETY.

N U M B E R I.

IF Ministers and Governors should successively trample upon the Rights of the Public; remove, replace, prefer, encrease Salaries, confer Titles and grant Pensions ; all manifestly tending to impoverish and enslave ; must not such Conduct open the Eyes of a Nation ?

Do not Country Gentlemen in Parliament (without a Leader) know that their Trust indispensably calls upon them to inspect the public Accounts ; to remonstrate against Principals and Accomplices in Embezzlements of public Money ; to demand Justice against public

public Offenders; especially those of enormous Size; to pray Resumption of public Grants, obtained by Fraud; and pass such Bills as tend to support the Strength and Honour of the Kingdom and to restore public Credit, national Confidence and Unanimity?

Can not, ought not Country-Gentlemen, who have suffered so much by the treachery of Leaders, take these obvious, necessary Steps, without a Leader, whether Orator or Politician?

May 14, 1757.

N U M B E R II.

Is your Money to be squandered in reward of Treachery, at the will of a Minister; without obtaining or asking your Consent?

If you acquiesce in this; what Idea have you of Property?

What security, in your Laws?

What possibility of maintaining Rights and Liberties?

Can you expect Redress; if you depend on Leaders who will sell you, to Ministers ready to buy you with your own Money?

If you have been fatally duped by both; will you not lay aside the Animosities which have render'd you a Prey to both?

Will you not renounce all private Connexions which cramp your free and bold pursuit of publick Welfare?

Will you not give up every Man of any Party, who has given up his Country?

Can it be doubted that many worthy Men of each Party, saw not the Snares laid for both; nor foresaw the Tendency of the Schemes of either?

Is it not plain, that Leaders of one Party would have sold you, if they could; and as plain, that Leaders of the other Party did sell you, as soon as they could?

Instead

Instead of trusting Ministers or Leaders of either Side ; does not common Sense direct you to be your own Leaders, and rely on your own Strength ?

Does not Self-Preservation, now, Summon all Parties to Coalition ?

May 21st, 1757.

N U M B E R . III.

Have Ministers forgot the old Maxim, DIVIDE ET IMPERA ?

Can you have greater Enemies to your Country, than Ministers who raise Party-Divisions ; to break the Strength and trample on the Rights of the People ?

Do not such Ministers fool one Half of the Nation, to aid them in oppressing the rest ; in the End, to enslave all ?

Can Ministers give due Attention to the civil Polity, the Military, the Marine, or any Part of the political System ; when their Eyes are fixed on the Spoils of a Treasury ?

Can the State be secure, or the Subject content ; when Places of publick Trust, due to Ability and Merit, are sold by Ministers to their Creatures, and given in Reward to their Instruments of Corruption ?

Can such Ministers duely weigh the Dangers from Popery and France, and the Danger of Discontents from Mal-Administration ?

Are not you, of British Race, intermixed with a numerous Train of Natives educated in Prejudices that give them a Leaning towards the inveterate Enemy of these Realms ; Prejudices, preparing them for foreign Influence, and subjecting them to foreign Jurisdiction ; Prejudices against your King, on Account of his Religion ; against your Constitution, on Account of its Inconsistency with the Tyranny of Popery ?

Are not these very Natives most amiable in their Nature ; abounding in Generosity, Hospitality, Humanity and Courage ; in Ability and Patience to un-

dergo extreme Hardships ? What a Treasure of Subjects would be restored to the Crown ; if their Prejudices could be removed ?

In a Kingdom thus circumstanced, would any Ruler of common Sense or common Honesty propagate Divisions, the bitterest Divisions, among Protestants most firmly attached both to King and Constitution ?

Suppose one Ruler should, for the Plunder of a Treasury (under the Mask of Prerogative) set such a People at Variance ; and another Ruler, for Aggrandizement of a Family, or the Purposes of private Connexions, keep up such Variance ; what could be said, in Excuse for either ?

The just and natural End of Government, thus inverted ; a Governor caballing, to ensnare the People ; a People concerting, to defend their Rights : Is not the Attention of the Governor, in such a Case, turned against the People ; the Attention of the People, diverted from Industry (the Means of enabling them to support Government) and driven to Measures of Self-Defence ?

In such a Case, could the Time of a succeeding Ruler be better employed, than in removing Jealousies and restoring Confidence ; by redressing Grievances and repairing Breaches of a shattered Constitution, by fundamental Law and Rights of Nature, FREE ?

July 16, 1757.

Further **QUERIES**, *proposed by the* **FREE-HOLDER'S-SOCIETY**, *to the People of* **IRELAND.**

NUMBER I.

What are the Things essentially to be regarded in the Choice of a Speaker ? Are they any other than competent

competent Abilities, an independent Fortune, Zeal for the Protestant Interest and Chastity in parliamentary Conduct?

N U M B E R II.

A Body of Men, Ministers of the Crown, set up above both Houses of Parliament; vested with a Power to prevent Petitions of either House from reaching the Throne, though ever so necessary for Introduction of new Laws or Reformation of the old—What could have given Rise to this, but the then Weakness of the *British* Settlements in *Ireland*, the Strength of the old Natives in Parliament, and their Power and rebellious Spirit throughout the Kingdom?

Should not Laws be adapted to Change of Times?

Are not regular Attempts, in a parliamentary Way, for a partial Repeal of *Poining's* Law, necessary for the common Good of King and People?

N U M B E R III.

What can be more mischievous or wicked than PARTY, founded on personal Connexion?

Is not PARTY, so connected, FACTION?

Can any Man be a Lover of his King and Country, who would lead or be led in such a Herd?

Have not Gentlemen got a Surfeit of Leaders?

Is not that Species (tho' dignified with the pompous Title of Undertakers) quite low, at present, in public Esteem?

Is it not hard to say whether the Office of Undertaker be grown, more an Object of Resentment or Contempt?

Would not employing an Undertaker be likely, in the present Way of thinking, to mar even a reasonable

reasonable Measure ; that might otherwise pass with Ease ?

Are a few Undertakers to govern a Parliament ; or is every Member to think and act, to the best of his Capacity, for the public Good ?

Should not a Viceroy treat Members with equal Regard, and trust his Business to the Gentlemen of the Country ?

Could such Behaviour cause Jealousy or raise Opposition ?

Should not a Governor choose to be respected by the whole Nation ; rather than raise Discontents, by making a few Men too powerful for either Government to deal with, or the People to keep in Order ?

Have not the People of *Ireland* uncommon Hopes in their present Lord Lieutenant, for Reasons universally known ?


If the People be inclin'd to make his Government easy and honourable ; who will be to blame, if it is not so ?

Will not honest and Loyal Subjects do the King's Business (which is also their own) without Fee or Reward ?

Have the Commons ever refus'd any Thing that was reasonable, when properly applied to ?

Will they not shew a proper Spirit ; if Leaders presume to answer for them, without being consulted ?

Will they tamely permit their Votes to be barter'd by an Undertaker ?



F I N I S

